Strategies for the Social Construction of Technology - the Case of Space Flight in the Federal Republic of Germany by Weyer, Johannes
STRATEGIES FOR THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGY • 
THE CASE OF SPACE FLIGHT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY 
Johannes Weyer 
When the European Research Ministers on November 9, 1987 determined on the "European 
Long TermSpace Plan 1987- 2000" 1, they opted for a big technology only comparable to 
nuclear technology or large scale military technologies such as e.g. SDI. The new dimensions 
European space flight now is aiming at, can be characterized by different aspects: 
i) The financial resources required to build up the European space systems are immense. 
Official figures oftheGerman Research Ministry (BMFf) in 1987 ~ccounted for 14 billion DM, 
which is equivalent to about two fast breeders, but it could be demonstrated by recalculating the 
ESA figures that much more money would be required. My prediction of 1987 that at least 8 
billion DM more would be required2 and that this would raise unsolvable problems for the 
research budget in the 1990s now has been confmned by German officials3, which arouses 
suspicions that the real problems might be even worse. 
ii) The technical systems of the ESA programme focus on manned space flight, which also 
indicates a new qualitiy in European space politics. The space station modules, named 
COLUMBUS, the mini shuttle HERMES, and the new rocket ARIANE V, mainly required to 
launch HERMES, all indicate that a large amount of resources within the long term prograrnme 
is directed towards manned space flight. Other projects such as planetary missions or scientific 
exploration of the earth will, according to official ESA plannings, slowly be reduced from 
68.5% (1987) to 28.8% (1993) and then to 26.4% (2000) of the total ESA budget4 , and a 
continuing cost explosion of manned systems might even aceeierate this trend. Projects such as 
earth observation or astronomic missions are to be shifted to rnanned systems, but the commu-
nity heavily criticizes this. The arguments are well-known: manned space flight is a hinderance 
not a promotion for research. 5 
iii) According to the strategies pursued by the Germanspace lobby (Western) Europe should 
obtain a leading rule in this new struggle for superiority in the world. In these concepts space 
flight is regarded as a symbolic instrument for the creation and prevailance of these new poli-
tics. 6 In my view the political usefulness of space flight is the only explanation for the emphasis 
given to manned systems. German astronauts in space are of only marginal use for the progress 
of science or economics, but the specific visibility of manned missions and the symbolic effect 
of being the first anywhere are of great use for politics, especially in the age of international 
hightech competition.7 
iv) Another new dimension of the space prograrnme is the social implications of this enterprise, 
which again demoostrate its deeply political character. In 1989, two years after the ESA 
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decision, lenghty negotiations about the foundation of a German space agency (DARA) and a 
German industrial-military-aerospace complex (Daimler-MBB) were completed and the two 
new institutions were fmally established. In both cases a diss~lution of traditional organizational 
arrangements which bad been constitutive for German space politics and a construction of 
totally new social relations took place. The delegation of the space programme to a private 
agency may be regarded as an important turning-point in West Germany's research politics. 
The purpose of this paper is to explain the social restructuring triggered by a technology pro-
gramme and to ask wliy technology can play this intermediate role in social games. The hypo-
thesis of this paper is as follows: In the case of space flight (and maybe in some other cases) 
technology has no value of its own, but is regarded by the co-players as a means of resttue-
turing the social arena in a way that serves one 's own interests. The configuration of the tech-
nology and its concrete use are of less importance compared with its function of establishing 
social networks between different social groups. 
The underlying assumption of this argument that manned space flight is a useless technology 
will be quite briefly discussed before outlining the sociologic model . 
The endless disaster of the European space programme 
In the years 1984 to 1987 proponents of the new ESA programme created a picture of manned 
space flight to be the key to Europe 's future. Without the new space systems Europe would fall 
back in the technological and economic race and soon be at the level of an underdeveloped 
country.S Research and development activities only possible under microgravity conditions9 
were judged as the forefront of scientific progress and as the key to technological and economic 
leadership. These arguments have frequently been rejected and refuted by most of its addres-
sees, i.e. the scientific community and the non-aerospace industry.IO Nevertheless they helped 
to legitimize the space projects in public debates. Only shortly after the ESA decision of 1987, 
however, it became obvious that even the space systems which constitute the technical base of 
all the premises will not work. The reasons are partly technical, partly political. HERMES, The 
European mini-shuttle, had tobe modified according to new safety standards developed after 
the CHALLENGERcrash-information possibly heldback until November 1987 in ordernot 
to disturb the ESA decision. The final outcome of all HERMES modifications is likely to lead to 
the result that HERMES will never fly or, if it can fly, it will not be able to carry a payload. 
Afterall HERMES is a useless project, a very expensive re-invention of the shuttle, which has 
gradually been redefined as a technology project indispensable for the development of the next 
generation of shuttles on the one hand and - besides - new hypersonic combat aircraft on the 
other.l1 The history of the space station since 1987 also challenges the assertion that Europe's 
future will depend on manned space flight. Only some weeks after the signing of the Memoran-
-252-
dum of Understanding between NASA and ESA on September 29, 1988 concerning the Euro-
pean COLUMBUS module (which is to become part ofthe U.S: space station) it became public 
that NASA, forced by budgetary pressure, is going to withdraw from the station project step by 
step. The configuration of the space station has been reduced to a minimum of the scale which 
the European had been baited with, the launch of the station has been delayed several times.12 
It is questionable whether manned space systemstobe launched in the late 1990s using techno-
logies of the 70s and 80s13 may be called high tech in an age when the innovation cycle in 
technology intensive industries has been reduced to only a few years. Even the Soviet Union is 
now calling into doubt their very cost-expensive space programme, although the Soviet ap-
proach had been much more conservative and incremental than the U.S.-European plans. 
Considering the disastrous situation of European space projects it is hardly surprising that the 
arguments propagated by the critics of manned space flight in 1986/87 are now common-sense 
even in parts oftheGerman governmental parties.l4 Now it can be asked why the conse-
quences of the ESA decision, which had been predicted already in 1987, were not taken into 
consideration when the decision was made. Was it foolish politicans who launched a program-
me of the scale of manned space flight without conducting a serious technology assessment 
beforehand? Some aspects of the problern may be covered by that argument, but as a sufficient 
explanation it is misleading. What were the reasons to vote for suboptimal or even non-functio-
ning technology? It is obvious to interpret HERMES as a political compromise with France and 
COLUMBUS as a political game with the U.S .. But games could also be played with func-
tioning technologies.15 And an important point- who is responsible for the irreversible social 
consequences of the decision for manned space flight? The German Space Agency DARA, 
brought into being by 'levers' such as HERMES, will persist even when HERMES is only a 
subject for techno-historians, just as NASA survived (even) when its original missiontobring a 
man to the moon had been completed. DARAas well as the new industrial aerospace leader 
DAIMLER-BENZ will generate their own social dynamics and will create ever new futuristic 
space flight projects (as NASA did). The failure of HERMES or, to take an example from the 
history of German space flight, the failure of the EUROPA-rocket in the 1960s did not 
deconstruct the social network of space flight and its social dynamics. Whether the technologies 
which helped to construct a social network, prove tobe successful or not obviously doesn't 
affect the dynamics of the network. It is social autodynamics rather than techni~al dynamics 
which push the development of ever new space projects. 
The social construction of technological dynamics 
In order to understand the German decision to support the ESA programme, it is necessary to 
reconstruct the genesis of this decision. My starting point, which of course is artifical, since 
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every historical event has predecessors and causes of its own, is the year 1983.This year marks 
a deep crisis in the German aerospace industry. After overproportional increases in the tumover 
rate in the late 1970s the rates became small or even negative in the early 1980s.16 The typical 
life cycle curve of big technologies 17 can be regarded as an important factor in this cyclic indu-
strial development. 
In the FR Germany big programmes such as the combat aircraft TORNADO or the space labo-
ratory SPACELAB were reaching the end of the production phase, and, seen from the view-
point of the user of these systems, there was only little need for launehing the next big pro-
gramme at the beginning of the utilization phase of the previous one. But for the aerospace 
industry the follow-on problern was a real pressure. The same applies in the case of the big 
science laboratory DFVLR: The large R&D programmes of the 1970s were soon tobe termi-
nated; the ARIANEprogramme was to end in 1986, the spacelabprogrammein 1983.18 
In this situation where the German aerospace industry and the big science laboratory were 
looking for follow-on projects, the American President Reagan announced his SDI-programme 
and one year later (1984) raised the project of an international space station. Both projects de-
fined space as the front where technological superiority and national strength could be demon-
strated. Both programmes offered opportunities for the cooperation of international partners, 
but the restriction of the fields of cooperation and the Subordination under U.S. control indicate 
that both SDI and the space station can be interpreted as measures within the global high-tech 
race, primarily aimed at Japan and Western Europe and not at the Soviet Union. 19 The Ameri-
can initiatives served as a support for the German space lobby who could now better argue that 
space flight was a main factor in international competition. The first German space programme 
released after SDI was a memorandum written by the German Association of the Aerospace 
fndustry (BDLl), published in 1984. It is interesting to see that this memorandumnot only calls 
for large new programmes (which is the duty of the aerospace lobby), but also tries to translate 
the demands of the industry into political terms. The BDLI argues that German space politics 
should be nationalized (i.e. the amount of the contribution to European programmes should .be 
reduced) and the German aerospace market should be protected against foreign competitors. It 
submitted this concern with reference to the "political independence" (BDLI 1984: 72) which 
e.g. new data relay satellites give to the nations. The proposal of a "national military communi-
cation satellite system" (p.49) also indicates that in the age of SDI the space lobby could argue 
with reference not only to the industrial policy impacts of defence programmes (cf.p.46) but 
also to the specific military utility value of space systems - an argument which was a novelty in 
the German space discourse, but which again could be applied as a lever to convince politicans 
of the political value of space flight. Cooperation projects with the U.S. and France, i.e. 
COLUMBUS, ARIANE and HERMES, are assessed of low interest to Germany, while a 
European space station and national satellites are at the centre of the BDLI proposals. 
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"European autonomy" and "German system leadership" became prominent terms in the pro-
grammes of the space industry lobby, indicating the political character of the argumentation. 
The Research Centre DFVLR also began to argue in this manner when it in turn released a 
voluminous "space flight strategy study" in 1984, which had been written by order of the 
Research Ministry. The arguments used to substantiate the projects listed by the DFVLR are 
much more sound and cautious than in the case of the BDLI, but the criteria for evaluation of 
the different seenarios discussed by the authors are purely political, namely European "auto-
nomy" (DFVLR 1984:96) and "German leadership" (p.XIV) in the European space program-
me. It is not surprising that the scenario selected by using these arguments is judged to be the 
best way because of its political potential (p.XIII) and its flexibility for future modifications. 
Besides, this scenario puts emphasis on German space systems; the French proposal HERMES 
is not part of it. 
In order to understand the new quality of the 1984 proposals, they must be compared with the 
previous memorandum, released in 1981 by the DFVLR together with the three major aerospace 
firms in Germany (Dornier, MBB, ERNO). Although military and political applications of 
space flight are also mentioned, the emphasis of the argumentation is on the innovation potential 
of space flight and especially of communication satellites (DFVLR 1981:2,7,11). Manned space 
', 
flight only plays a subordinated role. In 1984 the new political context, produced by Reagan's 
initiatives one the hand, the new conservative government in the FR Germany on the other 20 , 
made possible new forms of politicallegitimation of space flight, and enabled a call tobe made 
for programmes of new orders of magnitude. 
The German government had no clear position. In a cabinet decision on January 16, 1985 it 
opted "for European independence and transatlantic cooperation" 21 and continued its traditio-
nal double strategy by voting for COLUMBUS and ARIANE. The French proposals for 
strengthening European cooperation in space, be it civilian or military, were sharply rejected: 
"With the realisation of both these projects (COLUMBUS and ARIANE, J.W.) the 
options oftheGerman government, to ernhark on civilian (!?) projects of a similar size, 
are exhausted under the given circumstances." 22 
This strategy of combining European with transatlantic cooperation in space flight, which had 
marked the German "Sonderweg" in space politics since 1962, had different implications for the 
discourse about space flight in the rnid-eighties: 
i) It showed that German government was willing to launch large new space projects and to 
commit itself to the novel political justification of space flight without regard to the use of space 
flight in terms of R&D politics. Research Minister Riesenhuber clearly stated that he was not 
really willing to join those projects because he couldn't see any R&D justification. He preferred 
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to continue unmanned space research aimed at constructing a much smaller station than CO-
LUMBUS. 
ii) At the sametime the government's resolution really indicated a non-decision policy. In a 
situation where the U.S. had defined space as the place for a symbolic competition between the 
world's economic superpowers, a dual strategy above allwas not sufficient to satisfy the advo-
cates of a new Europe. Further it was illogical, seen from the viewpoint of space lobbyists, to 
rely on the good-will of the U.S. although European launehing systems and space station 
elements were already available or under construction. The ESA decision of January 31, 1985 
to accept the invitation to join the space station project expresses this mistrust, as to whether 
cooperation on the space station project could ever be realized "without discrimination" 23 
against Europe. 
The government's and the ESA decision of January 1985 thus indicate that outlines of a new 
space arena were fixed, but there still remained room for negotiation. The different partners 
were prepared to play the game, and a pre-selection of potential argumentative connections had 
been made: a justification of space projects by means of their scientific value, for example, was 
now socially much less valuable than a political justification, because it could not provide poli-
ticians with strong political arguments. Besides, such a justification was not acceptable to 
industry, which needed large long-time programmes for their own survival. A small number of 
scientific satellites could not serve this purpose, but a large number of rnilitary satellites or a 
complex configuration of manned systems could. 
The years from 1985 to 1987 can thus interpreted as a period of intensive "Kontextsteuerung" 
(Wilke) (contextual control), in which the different actors in the space arena strengthened the 
network by generaring arguments which fitted the strategies of their partners and helped to 
promote their positions. The remarkable result of this process is the fact that ESA revisited its 
"Long TermSpace Plan 1985 - 1995" 24 only two and a half years after it was passed in 
January 1985 and voted in November 1987 for the new long term programme mentioned 
above.The main difference between the two programmes is the emphasis the 1987 plan puts on 
autonomaus European space flight. This was symbolized by HERMES which now became 
another central element of the programme. Different factors played an important role in this 
process of negotiation. Some were external, such as the CHALLENGER accident. Others came 
from the European stage, where especially France was busily working to get the HERMES 
project launched. But most important is the way actors in the national space arena worked with 
the options available in the context, and how they shaped their strategies according to changing 
situations. 
In these discourses scientific or even technological or economic considerations played only a 
minor role. It is hardly understandable that Europe should, according to the decision taken in 
1987, re-invent the space shuttle only to have a means of decoupling from the space station they 
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just have coupled to with COLUMBUS. This programme is not only immanently illogical, its 
economic effiency and its scientific value are also questionable. Its technically suboptimal shape 
can only be understood as a result of negotiations between different interest groups and as a 
political compromise between different partners. 
The crude logic of the space programme was formulated by an expert group of a German policy 
research institute (DGAP) which united representatives of all interest groups in the space arena. 
It served as an intermediate organisation which linked the different positions and harmonized 
the interests and the arguments of the space lobby. In this way it strengthened the positions of 
its members: a space scientist could now argue, faced with opposite views in his scientific 
community, that his view was part of a network and that space science had to join the 
unavoidable trend. The core-argument which held this network together and which thus served 
as a sociallink was expressed in a memorandum of this expert group released in 1986. It states 
that West Germany has to become the "shaping power of a West European space power" 
(DGAP 1986:42). In a democratic society such as the FR Germany the social acceptability of a 
large space programme and its budgetary consequences, according to the memorandum, can 
only be achieved by a national consensus, which in turn could be stimulated by the "higher 
political symbol-effect" (p.38) of rnanned space flight. 
The intermediate function of the DGAP is thus evident. Firstly it served as a hybrid community 
between different social groups. Secondly it made available an argumentative figure (manned 
space flight as a means of national politics to conquer the world) that could not only convince 
the public but could also be retranslated into the subjective images of the different interest 
groups. For the group of the 'Europeans' within politics space flight now served as a symbolic 
means of European integration. For space scientists it helped to define new research frontiers, 
which had tobe promoted by R&D-programmes. And for the aerospace industry manned space 
flight was the way out of the dilemma of the cyclic development of big technologies, since ESA 
plans covered a period of at least 10 to 15 years and a long-term committment of the govern-
ment to space flight could be expected. It is understandable that this space network had a strong 
momentum and could not even be stopped by well-founded arguments against manned space 
flight. As the network included social actors, it also excluded others. 
Technology discourses as a 'lever' for social innovation 
The previous chapter has demonstrated that a technology programme may be the integrating 
element of a social network and the trigger of social dynamics. Now an attempt will be made to 
integrate this e~pirical evidence into a sociological model. This model must answer the question 
why technology can serve as an intermediate factor in social interactions. 
Since there are as many notions of technology as there are sociologies of technology, I shall try 
to answer the question from another starting point, i.e. the analysis of the interactions of social 
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systems. An important theoretical assumption in my considerations is the premise that no sepa-
rate social system 'technology'exists, but society can, according to Luhmann, be differentiated 
in social sub-systems such as science, economy and politics (to mention only those sub-
systems which play a role in space politics).25 A second assumption, derived from different 
concepts of systems theory (Wilke, Krohn/Küppers) claims that in a functionally differentiated 
society which has no privileged position for a central control, actors can only control other co-
actors by "Kontextsteuerung" (contextual control), i.e. by incentives which can be accepted by 
the addressee, but which, however, can also be rejected. 26 The producer of a social offer (e.g. 
a new research programme) has no control over the behaviour of his addressees. If this sounds 
like an "anything goes"-game, systems theory makes an important theoretical point in resolving 
this arbitrarity of social interaction and/or non-interaction when it focusses on the systemic 
conditions of "Anschlußfähigkeit" (sociallinkability). The sociallogic of the science system is 
the production of knowledge, the logic of the economic system is to deal with goods and 
money, and the political system operates with the logic of power. These three systemic mecha-
nisms are not comparable or interchangeable: Expensive research need not be true just as true 
knowledge need not be profitable. Luhmann deserves the credit for calling the sociologists' 
attention to the fact that social systems cannot communicate with each other on the level of their 
systemic code. Intersystemic communication in his view only takes place in a few cases where 
an event has a functional meaning in two systems. Luhmann doesn 't discuss the question of 
which events are likely to be communicated in different social systems and what social actors 
could do to increase the likelihood of intersystemic communication. These questions are outside 
the range of Luhmann 's interests. 
My claim now isthat there are some social phenomena which possess a general "Anschluß-
fähigkeit" in the sense that different social systems can communicate them because they fit into 
the sociallogic of the respective systems. Technology seems to be an intersystemic structure of 
this kind: it can be handled by the science system, since technological work is research in the 
sense of knowledge production. It cannot be distinguished from other research by the type of 
action required and the systemic code separating research from non-research. 27 From the 
perspective of the economic system, technology is a factor which affects production success. 
And the political system, finally, can deal with technology as a means of generating political 
power and/or legitimacy e.g. in the case of health, transport, communication or war technolo-
gies. 
This view implies a constructivistic perspective insofar as each social system interprets a 
concrete project, e.g. the space station, by its own systemic view. At the same time my ap-
proach tries to circumvent the trap Pinch and Bijker never found their way out of, when they 
had to introduce into their model the fact that despite different interpretations the artefact really 
exists. In my model the artefact plays a minor role, maybe because discourses in the specific 
case of space flight are mostly conducted a long time before the technologies are really built. As 
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mentioned in a previous chapter, artefacts do not disturb the discourse. What is communicated 
between different social groups are utopian ideas or visions of technology which may be inter-
preted in quite different ways with reference to the specific view of each system involved. 
Whether a consensus can be achieved that various partners are talking about the 'same' object is 
not a question of theory but of history. 
At the same time, however, it is evident that Strategie actors do not wait for intersystemic 
coupling to happen by chance (which is, as Luhmann says, rather unlikely), but actively try to 
construct chances. As Hughes showed very convincingly, innovative actors systematically 
integrate different perspectives (technical, economic, political) into their considerations and their 
strategies. 28 They do not simply react to their social context, but try to shape this context in a 
way that serves their interests. Krohn/Küppers have integrated this aspect of Strategie action and 
strategic networking into their model 'self-organization of science'. Technology could be, even 
if not explicitely mentioned by Krohn/Küppers, one of the feed-back loops by which social 
actors influence their context on the one band, and import resources as levers for social innova-
tions on the other. The latter is a significant aspect: intersystemic commuilication is not an end 
in itself, but a selfish purpose. Actors who mobilize other actors, construct intersystemic net-
works and mutually exchange resources do this because of the social benefits they can attain in 
this way. A simple example may illustrate this: a scientist who can make use of a novel research 
programme has competitive advantages compared with bis colleagues. However, he can draw, 
a maximum profit from such a constellation, if the initiative for the research programme has 
been bis idea and if he has been able to form the shape of this programme according to bis own 
purposes. This again is only possible if he can offer something to politics that has a specific 
political value, e.g. a ballistic missile defence, a cure·all for AIDS or the technology for ever-
lasting wealth (superconduction?). The example shows very convincingly that technology is a 
well-suited means of translation between different social logics. Because of this feedback 
mechanism in practice we will mostly observe interactive processes of mutual control, in which 
the translation of specific interests into the 'language' of other actors is the major task of Stra-
tegie players. 29 
Conclusion 
The sociological concept of technology discourses as a lever for social innovations, outlined 
very briefly 30, will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of big tech-
nology programs. Firstly, the model points to the fact that large scale teehnologies need equally 
large scale social support. To construct this social basis techno-visions are invented which serve 
as links between different actor groups and their individual interests. Since these visions must 
be acceptable in different social systems, translations into the different 'languages' of the social 
systems must be made. lf the translations fit to each other, the network will work and gain its 
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own dynamics, if not, it will fail. Secondly the model draws attention to the problern of re-
translation: For example a research group involved in hypersonic research that can only ensure 
the continuation of its work by integration into a programme of manned space flight is then 
forced to construct manned systems (e.g. HERMES), even if this purpose is not considered to 
be valuable by the scientific community. In this way, the network may develop autodynamics 
which produce effects the individual actors did not aim at. Thirdly the model focusses on the 
relation between technical and social dynamics, as it shows that technical innovations, or more 
specifically discourses about such innovations, are a means for the achievement of social 
innovations. As soon as these social innovations are accomplished, they may 'forget' their 
history: whether HERMES will fly or not will probably not affect the institutional innovations 
generated by the 'lever' HERMES. Artefacts need not interfere with discourses, and discourses 
need not necessarily lead to functioning technologies. 'Negotiation about technology' is a 
strategic game with social implications which cannot be reduced to technical impacts. 
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